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NATIONALISM AS THE NEW FEDERALISM (AND FEDERALISM 
AS THE NEW NATIONALISM): A COMPLEMENTARY ACCOUNT 
(AND SOME CHALLENGES) TO THE NATIONALIST SCHOOL 
ABBE R. GLUCK* 
INTRODUCTION 
When Heather Gerken asks you to get in a car, you go along for the ride. 
Sometime later, however, you may find yourself asking, “Why am I here?” 
and, then later, “Where exactly is this force of nature taking me?” 
I have had the good fortune of being placed in precisely this situation, 
having been generously included as a fellow traveler in Professor Gerken’s 
account of the new “Nationalist School” of federalism.
1
 I puzzle sometimes 
over whether I really belong here and where exactly the car is going. My own 
account of modern nationalism is more state-centered—more traditionally 
“federalist”—than that of the Gerken pack, although as I will detail, I believe 
my account is complementary to, rather than in conflict with, theirs. But the 
Nationalist School also has some more work to do to define its theory of 
nationalism and what differentiates it from what came before. It also lacks a 
doctrinal component, apparently intentionally, and so runs the risk of adding to 
the doctrinal nebulousness of a field—cooperative federalism—whose legal 
principles can only be described as twenty years of mush. 
With the caveats that this is only a preliminary take on what is likely to be 
years of debate and that my own views are more in common with, than 
different from, those of the nationalists, this Article develops the flip side of 
the Gerken account—a flip side that I call “nationalism as the new 
federalism”—and challenges the Nationalist School to do more to back up its 
theory and not to give up on the doctrine. 
 
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This is an edited version of remarks orally delivered at the 
2014 St. Louis University Law School Childress Lecture, in honor of Heather Gerken, an 
incomparable mentor, friend and inspiration. For their assistance, many thanks to Nina Cohen, 
James Dawson, Bridget Fahey, Grace Hart, Maya Hodis, Stephanie Krent, and Michael Shapiro 
and also specially to Joel Goldstein for his perseverance and patience in getting me to St. Louis. 
 1. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1889, 1918 (2014). 
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I.  THE FLIP SIDE OF THE GERKEN ACCOUNT: NATIONALISM AS THE NEW 
FEDERALISM 
The essence of Professor Gerken’s argument is that federalism now serves 
“ends” not traditionally associated with federalism at all.
2
 These ends include 
enabling a voice for minorities—contra those who have historically viewed 
federalism as suspiciously associated with racism—and a policy churn that 
results in national (i.e., sometimes uniform and preemptive) “best” solutions to 
vexing issues of the day—contra the textbook account of federalism as 
preferring and entrenching ongoing interstate variation.
3
 Her argument also 
rests on a “competing vision of state power.”
4
 As Professor Gerken so 
provocatively puts it, her account does not depend on state sovereignty but, 
rather, embraces the “power of the servant”—action at the local, even 
nongovernmental (e.g., juries) level or actions by states acting under the 
control of federal law. Professor Gerken argues that, so understood, federalism 
is the new nationalism
5
: federalism is simply a “means” to the more important 
national “end.”
6
 
My own work offers a somewhat different take on the same descriptive 
landscape—and this is what, at times, causes me to wonder how I got into 
Professor Gerken’s car in the first place. Both of us are driven in part by the 
undoubtedly broad reach of national power today. We agree that Congress’s 
lawmaking reach—provided that it structures its statutes correctly
7
—is now 
essentially unlimited with respect to the areas into which federal statutory 
power can go, including into areas of traditional state control, such as health 
and education. As a result, both of us view as the central question of modern 
federal-state relations not whether Congress can displace state law but, rather, 
how to conceptualize the role of the states within this federal-law-dominated 
legal landscape. 
But I see an opportunity for state power itself within these national 
statutory schemes—power for states qua states—and not just a type of state 
activity designed to further nationalist ends. I have previously described this as 
 
 2. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 997, 998 (2014). 
 3. Id. at 1003. 
 4. Id. at 998. 
 5. Id. at 997. 
 6. Id. at 998. 
 7. For example, the ruckus over the Commerce Power in the 2012 constitutional litigation 
over the Affordable Care Act, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 
(2012), would have been avoided had Congress simply used the Taxing Power to more directly 
accomplish its goal of bolstering the insurance industry in the face of the ACA’s major insurance 
reforms, instead of the more indirect (Commerce-Clause-based) route of requiring everyone to get 
insured. 
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“federalism from federal statutes,” how states effectuate traditional federalism 
goals from the inside of federal law rather than by standing apart from it.
8
 This 
is a very different conceptualization of federalism’s domain, and of its modern 
source, from the traditional account, but it is still a federalism 
conceptualization. I still see the states acting as states (and not just the 
Gerkenist loci for contestation and accommodation, which might not depend 
on these local actors being “states” at all), but doing so in a new venue. This 
federalism’s primary source is Congress and its primary domain is federal 
statutory law. 
States now gain, not lose, from their inclusion in federal statutes as 
frontline administrators of federal law and—contra the position of the 
traditional federalists—states lose when they are left out of federal schemes 
altogether. States lose via exclusion because, as (federalist) Ernest Young puts 
it, without federal-law responsibilities, states will not have “[anything] 
meaningful [left] to do.”
9
 In other words, the structural choice for major policy 
questions today is rarely—as traditional federalists would frame it—between 
federal regulation or state regulation. Instead, the choice is almost always 
between federal regulation with the states or federal regulation alone. Professor 
Gerken acknowledges this point, although she puts a national twist on it. In her 
Article, she posits “politics, not law” as “the real obstacle to uniformity”—an 
acknowledgement that Congress can fully preempt state law wherever it wants 
if politics allow.
10
 I would push further to recognize that those same political 
considerations also incentivize Congress to include state actors in federal 
schemes, in ways that further ends that may sometimes be as federalist as they 
are nationalist. 
For a concrete example, consider which of the following two federal 
programs has given states more policy influence, more autonomy, and even 
more sovereign lawmaking power: Medicare, the all-federal health insurance 
program for the elderly and disabled, or Medicaid, the federal health insurance 
for the poor, which is jointly administered by states and the federal 
government? States have had virtually no influence over the development of 
Medicare policy.
11
 They pass no state laws to implement it, appoint no state 
cabinet members to run it, and their state courts have almost no jurisdiction 
over questions arising from it, despite the fact that large portions of each 
state’s citizenry are covered by it. In contrast, states have passed hundreds of 
 
 8. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the 
Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2013). 
 9. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,  1385  
(2001). 
 10. Gerken, supra note 2, at 998. 
 11. Gluck, supra note 8, at 1753, 1758. 
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state laws and state regulations; appointed state officials; and state courts have 
heard thousands of cases arising under state law as part of the states’ role in 
Medicaid.
12
 States have innovated in these efforts and, as a result, individual 
states have had an enormous influence on shaping Medicaid policy for the 
whole nation. 
To be sure, when Congress enacted Medicaid and Medicare, Congress 
invaded—preempted and displaced—a legal domain (health) traditionally 
within the states’ purview. But like Professor Gerken, I consider that initial 
question—the possibility of federal intervention in the first place—a ship that 
has since sailed. So let us ask the next question, the one more relevantly 
situated in federalism’s current federal statutory domain: what would have 
been the result had Congress left the states out of Medicaid too? Or left the 
states out of the Affordable Care Act? State law would essentially cease to be 
relevant on matters of health. With these federal statutes Congress surely did 
take state power away with one hand; but with the other—indeed, 
simultaneously through the same action—Congress preserved the relevance 
and vitality of the state sovereign lawmaking apparatus in the health arena in 
ways that wholesale exclusion from the federal story simply could not have 
done. 
Make no mistake: Medicare and Medicaid are both federal programs, and 
there is no legal difference between them when it comes to formal 
(constitutional) definitions of federalism. They are both federal law and 
preemptive. But it is no fluke that Medicare is called “Medicare” everywhere 
but that Medicaid is rarely called “Medicaid” in the states. Medicaid bears 
local names, such as “TennCare” in Tennessee, and “Husky Health” in 
Connecticut,
13
 which provides explanatory evidence of these programs’ very 
state-centered identities even though, as a formal legal matter, they are 
indistinguishable from “purely” federal programs (because they are federal 
statutes too). On the ground—both with respect to how the programs are 
experienced and also with respect to what legal apparatus (state or federal) is 
actually crafting the policy—these two fraternal twins are anything but 
identical. Medicaid doesn’t give us “capital F” constitutional federalism,
14
 but 
it is federalism to be sure. 
 
 12. Id. at 1758, 1760, 1762. 
 13. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2007 (2014); 
Connecticut’s Health Care for Children & Adults, HUSKY HEALTH CONNECTICUT, 
http://www.huskyhealth.com/hh/site/default.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2015); What’s New with 
TennCare, TENNCARE, http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
 14. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (elaborating a theory of “small c” constitutional law created by 
statutory and administrative transformations). 
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I do not mean to imply that courts and scholars for decades have not 
acknowledged the prevalence of such “cooperative federalism,” of which 
Medicaid is a favorite example. Some traditional federalists have also come to 
recognize the state power to be gained from this interactive, rather than 
“separate spheres,” model of state-federal relations.
15
 But even these more 
expansive inquires have not grappled with what is truly provocative about an 
account that recognizes that states exert their greatest powers from within 
federal statutory schemes: namely, that this federalism’s primary source—
rather than its primary antagonist—is Congress. 
In other words—and this where I offer the complement to the Gerken 
theorization— I see nationalism as the new (new) federalism.
16
 Federalism—in 
the sense of state power, relevance, autonomy, and sovereignty—mostly comes 
and goes at Congress’s pleasure. It is a question, and feature, of federal 
statutory design. This is what federalism looks like in the “Age of Statutes,”
17
 
and it is a powerful account that the Nationalist School appreciates, often 
agrees with, but does not sufficiently elevate. 
II.  SOME COMMON GROUND AND THE NATIONALISM-FEDERALISM 
CONTINUUM 
In her Childress Lecture, Professor Gerken goes farther than she has in the 
past to emphasize the kind of modern, federal-statute-generated state power 
that I have described.
18
 As such, hers is a more “federalist” account of the 
Nationalist School than previously offered, and creates a stronger bridge 
between our work. There is a second important link, too. The primary thesis of 
the Childress Lecture is the notion of a nationalism-federalism “détente.”
19
 I 
would characterize this argument as a claim that the war is no longer worth 
fighting because there is now too much slippage between the categories for any 
battlefield to be identified. 
And this emphasis on the collapse of the categories, I think, is a primary 
reason that I am along for the ride. Because I see federalism as a feature of 
federal statutory design, my view of federalism necessarily exists within 
nationalism and so cannot function without a more fluid conception of both 
federalism and nationalism. And distinct from the traditional conceptions of 
 
 15. See Young, supra note 9, at 1375–86. 
 16. Distinguished from the old “new federalism” a term typically employed to describe the 
Rehnquist Court’s revival of dualism in constitutional and statutory cases. 
 17. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) 
(developing a new theory of judicial review for the modern era in which statutes dominate the 
common law as our legal system’s primary source of law). 
 18. Gerken, supra note 2, at 997. 
 19. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1050 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1045 
 
federalism and state power, my account of statutory federalism—because it is 
optional for Congress—is neither a constant presence nor an entitlement. This 
is federalism by the grace of Congress, and so it can appear in as many 
different forms as the number of federal statutes. It looks different and has 
various levels of strength across a wide continuum of laws. Some federal 
statutes are national all the way down, like Medicare, while others put states at 
the forefront, like the Clean Air Act, while still others lie somewhere in 
between. 
Moreover, Congress’s motivations in its statutory-design choices are likely 
to be multiple and sometimes in tension along the nationalism-federalism 
continuum. My early work on this subject advanced an argument quite closely 
aligned with Professor Gerken’s argument today about federalism as a 
“means” to national ends. I argued that state implementation of federal law can 
serve as a tool of federal statutory encroachment and entrenchment. That 
argument turned on the understanding that, despite the formal equivalence (in 
terms of federal-law preemption) of federal statutes administered entirely by 
the federal government and federal statutes administered largely by the states, 
the federal legal intrusion seems less invasive and tends to be more politically 
palatable when states are given frontline roles, thereby facilitating national-law 
encroachment.
20
 Deploying state implementers also facilitates national-law 
entrenchment, by enmeshing the federal statute in an often-newly-created web 
of state laws and state bureaucracy generated to implement it. So understood, 
enlisting the states to implement federal law helps federal statutes get passed 
and makes them harder to undo. This is not exactly the same concept as 
Professor Gerken’s “federalism as the new nationalism” because hers is, in 
many ways, a less cynical account—one in which local voice and variation knit 
together a nation, accommodate difference, and often generate good national 
policy. But it is nevertheless an account of how federalism (within federal 
statutes) furthers national power. 
But unlike Professor Gerken, I also believe that state power—as an end 
worth achieving itself—is being created in these federal schemes, often 
simultaneous with federal encroachment, for the reasons that I have described. 
Indeed, four years ago, Professor Gerken and I almost wrote an article titled: 
“Federalism as the New Nationalism and Nationalism as the New Federalism” 
(an article that did not materialize entirely due to my own distractions). That 
hypothetical piece, as evidenced by its title, would have both illuminated these 
differences across our work but also painted a clear picture of how our 
 
 20. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 572–74 
(2011). 
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accounts rely on the slippage across the categories and the way they operate 
simultaneously and in tension. 
It would be an intellectual and accuracy loss for the emergence of the 
Nationalist School to obscure this counternarrative, perhaps better described as 
a complementary narrative. Even as federalism may be the new nationalism, 
nationalism is also the new federalism. 
III.  THREE CHALLENGES FOR THE NATIONALIST SCHOOL 
Regardless of whether I truly belong in this car—that is, whether I am a 
legitimate member of the “Nationalist School” (the answer depends on the 
extent to which the school is capacious enough to include a more state-
centered account and a true continuum across the categories)—I think the new 
nationalists still have some significant theoretical and doctrinal groundwork to 
lay. Professor Gerken lets them (and herself) too easily off the hook: 
announcing the emergence of the new nationalism and simultaneously 
declaring the time to end the war it has emerged to fight has come, without 
doing some work to define, defend, and differentiate the new theory. This 
Section focuses on three areas for future deliberation. The first is the 
importance of the complementary side of the nationalist account, which I 
already have begun to detail. The second is the need for a much more 
developed theory of nationalism. And the third is a challenge to the Nationalist 
School to engage the doctrinal questions it seems to wish to avoid and to think 
more about how law can contribute to creating the kinds of democracy the 
nationalists envision. These are, after all, matters that go to the heart of our 
government structure and they should not be left to judicial improvisation. 
A. Federalism as Nationalism Tells Only Half the Story 
I already have detailed what I think, until now, has been a descriptive and 
theoretical weakness for the new nationalists; namely, their reluctance to fully 
embrace the complementary federalist component to their account. Professor 
Gerken’s Childress Lecture does much in this vein and so reduces my burden 
here. That said, it is worth pausing to further define features of the 
complementary account, beyond those already offered, in order to substantiate 
its significance. 
1. This Is Where Federalism’s (Not Just Nationalism’s) Key Debates 
Are Playing Out 
One important feature of the other side of the Nationalist School’s 
theorization of the “federalism as nationalism” relationship is simply the 
greater legal prevalence of the opposite “nationalism as federalism” account. 
Federalism from federal statutes—nationalism as federalism—is the primary 
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kind of federalism that occupies the courts today and the domain in which the 
most important modern federalism debates are playing out. On the one hand, 
this prevalence offers a rebuttal to the traditional federalists, many of who 
refuse to acknowledge that federalism derives from federal statutes at all. But it 
also complicates new nationalist account, in two different ways. 
First, these cases generally do not treat this kind of federalism as a “means 
to an end,” as Professor Gerken would.
21
 Rather, these cases continue to 
emphasize the more traditional federalism value of the states qua states. They 
simply find the locus of federalism in the same modern statutory landscape 
from which the Nationalist School draws its more nation-centered account. 
One reason for this may be, as I detail below, that the legal community does 
not have any elaborated theory of nationalism that could be the basis of these 
cases in the first place, and the new Nationalist School has yet to provide one. 
It also may be because the majority of judges share my view of importance of 
assuring the enduring legal vitality of the states qua states. 
But second and perhaps more importantly, this case law also substantiates 
the arguments of scholars like Ernest Young, who argues that, when it comes 
to federalism in the modern landscape, there is a “constitution outside the 
Constitution” formed by federal statutes that utilize state actors.
22
 Those 
statutes and the state-federal relationships they create ultimately may have 
more relevance to our modern legal understanding of “federalism” than 
traditional constitutional law can offer. To this point, Young often cites a 
passage from a statutory interpretation/preemption opinion by Justice Breyer: 
“Indeed, in today’s world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of 
federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim 
Congress’ commerce power at its edges . . . but in those many statutory cases 
where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of 
the law.”
23
 
Ready support for Justice Breyer’s conceptualization can be found in the 
recent United States Supreme Court docket. Of the twenty-six times that 
members of the Court invoked “federalism” over the three terms ending in 
2013, all but five involved statutory—not constitutional—federalism of the 
kind I have described.
24
 These were federalism questions that, unlike the 
constitutional variety, were not about whether Congress has the power to 
 
 21. Gerken, supra note 2, at 998. 
 22. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 410 
(2007). 
 23. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Ernest A. 
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts 
Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 254 (2012). 
 24. For details on all twenty-six references, see Gluck, supra note 13, at 2003–04. 
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regulate in a particular area but, rather, questions that asked what exactly 
Congress intended the role of states to be when it included states in a federal 
statutory scheme that all agree Congress had the power to enact. 
Six of these mentions occurred in ordinary statutory 
interpretation/preemption cases. Preemption cases are cases about federal 
statutory design. They do not raise questions about Congress’s power to 
legislate over state terrain, or even about its power to legislate on the particular 
subject at hand; they merely raise questions about how clearly Congress speaks 
to the particular issue in question. This category includes Arizona v. United 
States, the high-salience “federalism” challenge to Arizona’s immigration 
law.
25
 It also includes City of Arlington v. FCC, a fight over the federal 
telecommunications law. There, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court—
literally crying “faux-federalism” on behalf of the old-fashioned federalists—
emphatically wrestled with but ultimately resisted the idea that “real” 
federalism comes into play in questions about the division of labor between 
state and federal agencies implementing the same federal statute.
26
 
Another high-salience case, Shelby County v. Holder, concerned the 
special federal preclearance requirements applicable to only certain states 
under the Voting Rights Act.
27
 The Court repeatedly used the term 
“sovereignty,” but not to dispute the power of the federal government to 
interfere with the states’ control over their own elections. Rather, the Court 
used the term to emphasize that “all the [s]tates enjoy equal sovereignty”—
apparently within the confines of federal law.
28
 Federal intrusion was not the 
main problem: the problem was the fact that it applied unequally (without 
justification, in the Court’s view) to various states. 
Another nine of the twenty-six “federalism” invocations, plus two more 
mentions only of “sovereignty,” were habeas cases.
29
 All of these habeas cases 
have a strong “federalism-by-the-grace-of-Congress” component: the interplay 
between state and federal law in many of these cases is a matter of federal 
statutory design, through Congress’s choice in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) to, in the Court’s words, “promot[e] 
comity, finality, and federalism” by building deference to state procedures into 
the federal statute.
30
 Other cases involved new doctrinal questions about how 
 
 25. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–2501 (2012). 
 26. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013). 
 27. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, 2619–20 (2013). 
 28. Id. at 2621–23. 
 29. Gluck, supra note 13, at 2003 n.23, 2004 n.25. 
 30. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 (2011). 
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to parse and enforce state and federal power within statutory schemes outside 
of the habeas context.
31
 
Professor Gerken resists seeing this inextricable connection between 
statutory-interpretation law and the kind of constitutional-democracy law she 
argues she is developing. She contends that my preoccupation with the law of 
legislation as federalism’s primary modern domain is different—and in her 
view less complex—than the questions “about which most of the new 
nationalists write (those involving constitutional interpretation and democratic 
design).”
32
 I resist this distinction. Professor Gerken herself acknowledges that 
federal statutes are the primary frameworks of her new nationalism and so, for 
her too, much of the time, “democratic design” is by definition, statutory 
design. It is not the Constitution that is creating the federalism here, nor is it 
the Constitution that is being interpreted. 
I think the real difference between us is that Professor Gerken is most 
preoccupied with the normative question of when Congress should legislate 
preemptively, whereas I would leave that question to the political process and 
focus instead on the question of how to effectuate statutory meaning and 
elevate state power when Congress does choose to design statutes with state 
roles. But these are all questions about the law of statute-making. It would be a 
different endeavor altogether to instead try to create a brand new theory to 
govern when Congress should legislate in the first place and when Congress 
should resist using its acknowledged power. That might be a new layer of 
constitutional law, and perhaps is a seed in Professor Gerken’s mind, but it is 
not an argument that she directly takes on her lecture. 
2. This Is Where Federalism’s Textbook Values Are Being Realized 
Another important feature of the flip-side account (nationalism as 
federalism, rather than vice versa) is that it is in this context where we now see 
federalism’s “textbook” values most often instantiated. 
 
 31. See Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013) (raising the question, in the 
Medicaid context, of whose job it is—the state’s, the federal agency’s, or the Court’s—to fill gaps 
in cooperative statutory schemes when the statute is silent); Douglas v. Indep. Living Center of S. 
Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (raising, but not answering, the question of whether California 
citizens could challenge their state’s implementation of the federal Medicaid statute when the 
federal agency itself had not chosen to challenge the state’s action); Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. 
v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011) (raising, but not answering, the question of Congress’s “power 
to affect the internal operations of a State,” or to give state actors power they would not otherwise 
have under state law). For two cases about the state-federal relationship under the Spending 
Clause, see Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011), and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 32. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1043. 
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a. State Sovereignty and Autonomy from Within Federal Statutes 
I have already discussed how federalism from federal statutes maintains an 
important role for the state sovereign lawmaking apparatus, in comparison with 
Congress fully displacing state law. It also should be obvious that, in an era in 
which the only actual choice on major questions tends to be federal law 
administrated by the federal government or federal law administered at least in 
part by the states, that in such an era states will lose autonomy by being 
excluded. Consider whether states would have more policy autonomy over 
education by coming up with their own plans under No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) or more policy autonomy by staying out of NCLB altogether and 
having Congress impose a uniform solution. In the health care context, the 
states that have had the most policy control over Medicaid are the ones that 
chose to participate in the ACA’s optional expansion of that program.
33
 Those 
states have used that participation to shape the program in ways that 
fundamentally diverge from the President’s own preferences, including 
privatizing it.
34
 The states that have opted out of the expansion, by contrast, 
have had no such leverage to alter existing Medicaid policy in those states. 
b. State Experimentation Happens More Within Federal Statutes Than 
Outside of Them 
Turning now to federalism’s most famous value—the well-worn cliché of 
federalism as enabling the states to act as “laboratories” of policy 
experimentation
35
—political scientists and other experts have long asserted 
that, Brandeis notwithstanding, states are not actually the ideal experimenters 
when forced to go it alone.
36
 Experimentation is expensive, and states risk 
losing business by experimenting when neighboring states do not. 
As it turns out, states do better experimenting under the protective cover of 
a federal law that levels the playing field and sometimes also provides helpful 
financing. I have elaborated these findings elsewhere, but for familiar evidence 
one need only look to some of most the famous state-led policy experiments of 
 
 33. The Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius ruled ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional. It 
was originally designed by Congress as mandatory. 
 34. Arkansas is a prime example. See Sarah Kliff, Arkansas’s Unusual Plan to Expand 
Medicaid, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
wonkblog/wp/2013/02/28/arkansass-different-plan-to-expand-medicaid/. 
 35. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 36. Gluck, supra note 8, at 1764 (2013); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and 
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 610–11 (1980); 
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA 
L. REV. 903, 924–26 (1994). For a general overview, see David A. Super, Laboratories of 
Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
541 (2008). 
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our time—including air pollution policy and the Massachusetts health reform 
that was itself the model for the ACA. Contrary to popular understanding, 
these were not traditional “federalism” experiments but, rather, were federally 
financed and federal-law protected experiments, done under and as part of 
federal statutes—specifically, the Clean Air Act and Medicaid.
37
 
c. Diversity and Local Variation Within Federal Statutory Law 
The third common bucket of core “federalism” values is the value of local 
variation, the notion that we cannot rely only on national-level law because our 
polity is too diverse for one-size-fits-all policy. I return to this point in the next 
Part, but the important and primary response here is that national law today not 
only tolerates policy variation—even internal to a single federal statutory 
scheme—but actively encourages it. Federal legislation today often 
intentionally incentivizes states to implement federal law in different ways 
from one another. The ACA, for example, expressly posits that insurance 
markets organized under the Act will look very different in different states.
38
 
d. Why Does No One Focus on the Local Work of State Government? 
Of course, it is not my claim that state governments do not have any 
relevance outside of federal law. No one denies that state governments control 
local services and decide local regulatory matters, all in their sovereign 
capacity. That is the everyday work of local government, and it is certainly true 
that such locality brings government closer to the people in ways that are 
productive for democracy. But it is a very interesting puzzle that that kind of 
work—the local, everyday governing work—is not at all where even old-
fashioned federalists train their attention or defend as the kind of sovereignty 
we must value or fight to protect. 
A possible explanation for the lack of interest in these everyday matters is 
that such local work, though critically important to daily life, does not typically 
give states real “power” on the national scale. For federalism to do what 
federalists claim it is supposed to do—among other things, serve as a check on 
a large national government and give the people voice in the context of the 
larger nation—the states need to be able to exert some power on the national 
scale.
39
 Thus, we can emphatically say that the states can have important 
relevance at the local level, even in isolation, but at the same time say that they 
 
 37. Gluck, supra note 8, at 1763–65. 
 38. Gluck, supra note 20, at 589–90 (describing how the ACA promotes interstate variation). 
 39. And for federalism to do what the new nationalists claim it is supposed to do—allow for 
minority voice, accommodation of difference, and productive policy development—the 
“government” aspect of federalism is not even essential. 
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cannot have significant national power without being players in the federal 
statutory game. 
B. Nationalism Without Theory 
Professor Gerken’s account of federalism, as I have noted, is different. For 
her, federalism is a means to an end, and that end is “nationalism.”
40
 But what 
she and her fellow travelers mean by “nationalism” remains unclear, in part 
because they are not building on any historical foundation that preexisted their 
new school. Searching the Westlaw database for the term “federalism” yields 
more hits than the system can accommodate. Searching, on the other hand, for 
the term “nationalism,” yields only a handful of results, which are mostly 
about patriotism and not at all about nationalism in any sense related to 
federalism or the context of this discussion. 
1. Nationalism Has to Mean More Than Uniformity 
We have elaborated theories of “Our Federalism,”
41
 but have no theory at 
all of “Our Nationalism,” an omission that seems remarkable. Federalism is 
associated with the panoply of values already discussed—separation of 
powers, liberty, experimentation, variation, voice, and so on—while 
nationalism seems associated mostly with a single value: uniformity. And 
indeed, the word “uniformity” comes up 1407 times in the Westlaw Supreme 
Court database as a justification for congressional policies or for certain types 
of nationalizing judicial decisions. 
Can that really be it? Uniformity as the defining and sustaining feature of 
our nationalism? If so, then nationalism is in trouble. Uniformity no longer 
seems a useful concept to anchor theories of nationalism because Congress 
now often desires disuniform implementation of national law and designs 
statutes with prominent roles for the states to accomplish precisely that. As 
detailed, values like experimentation, variation, and tailoring to local 
circumstances are now integral components of nationalist policy making too. 
So, if nationalism’s value turns on uniformity, nationalism no longer has any 
distinguishing feature. 
In my view, the new nationalists need to come up with a deeper account of 
what nationalism is—what nationalism is for. They must do this to 
complement our developed theories of federalism and also illustrate what they 
are fighting for. Even as Professor Gerken is marvelously provocative, her own 
theory of nationalism (along with that of others who align themselves with her 
on this front)
42
 is, I think, somewhat conventional. Although I know she would 
 
 40. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1007–09. 
 41. Younger, District Att’y of L.A. Cty. v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971). 
 42. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1058 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1045 
 
resist the characterization, Professor Gerken is, in an important sense, a 
uniformist herself. For her, nationalism is a means to an end—a policy churn 
that leads to an ideal national (i.e., single) policy decision. 
At the Childress Lecture, Professor Gerken responded to this criticism with 
the contention that the new nationalists are not uniformists because, in a given 
circumstance, the “ideal” policy solution might be a policy of tolerating or 
encouraging local variation.
43
 But understand that such an outcome—a federal 
statutory policy favoring local variation—would still be preemptive (just as a 
federal court’s choice to use state law as the rule of decision is still federal 
lawmaking). The rule that is chosen does not affect the identity of its source. 
Here, the “nationalist” solution is still a single, nationally chosen (preemptive) 
policy outcome, just one that endorses disuniformity. 
The Childress Lecture offers another kind of response to the uniformity 
charge that may be more satisfying. The new nationalists also embrace 
“federalism as nationalism” for the way in which it creates institutional 
opportunities for minorities to participate in political decision-making, which 
Professor Gerken calls “dissenting by deciding.”
44
 Consistent with Professor 
Gerken’s emphasis on new nationalism as essential to “a well-functioning 
democracy,” she seems motivated at least in part by the idea that allowing for 
some tolerable—but controlled—amount of policy churn and variation internal 
to the polity may be the best way to build a stable nation. This merit of 
federalism is not limited to the nationalist account, and so is not new (which of 
course doesn’t diminish it as relevant for Professor Gerken). Legal historian 
Allison LaCroix has told a similar story about the way that (tradtional) 
federalism helped to knit together the polity in the early years of the nation.
45
 
Many other scholars have long extolled the internal diversity that can exist 
even within a single federal law,
46
 another value implicit in the Gerken 
account. But Professor Gerken’s version is supervised; hers is a safer kind of 
policy churn, because it occurs within a federal floor or ceiling or at least under 
the watchful eye of a Congress that can always preempt.
47
 
 
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2131–33 (2014). 
 43. Heather Gerken, Keynote Speech at the St. Louis University School of Law Childress 
Lecture (Oct. 24, 2014). 
 44. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
 45. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2093 (2014). 
 46. For a classic example, see Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: 
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. 
REV. 797, 828–32 (1957). 
 47. In some regard, Mishkin’s account is similarly controlled, because federal courts are 
always there to manage the internal diversity of federal law. See id. I do not dispute Professor 
Gerken’s claim that this is not so different from my account in the sense that my account—
because it depends on Congress—“similarly involves a national decision about whether and how 
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This, however, leads to a different kind of problem for the new 
nationalists, namely, how to reconcile the competing values internal to the 
account. By strengthening national power, federalism as nationalism may 
ultimately make it easier for Congress to preempt local experiments when the 
sweet-spot/breaking point of policy churn occurs. So the big question is how 
the nationalists draw the line: when to unify and when to allow for local 
differences? Professor Gerken doesn’t offer a theory of how to determine the 
ideal amount of policy churn and she does not argue that there is some 
determinate amount of internal variation that might generally be ideal. Rather, 
it all seems dependent on subjective preferences about the particular policy at 
issue. The new nationalists will tolerate policy churn until some “ideal” policy 
is developed or until the amount of internal variation becomes intolerable. So 
in the end, the answer again seems to lie in preemptive national policymaking 
one way or the other. 
2. Is the New Nationalism Indistinguishable from States as Laboratories 
Federalism? 
To my view, this new account seems not very different from the 
Brandeisian “states as laboratories” concept—the idea that states will 
experiment in ways that contribute to national policy-making by trying out 
different policy solutions that later may be adopted by the whole. Professor 
Gerken and similarly situated authors resist this association with Brandeis. But 
it remains difficult for me to see, apart from the use of the new label 
“nationalism” instead of “federalism,” how the prescription for good 
democracy that Professor Gerken offers—each state doing its own thing with a 
goal of creating policy churn and space for diversity that may ultimately lead 
to positive national policy solutions—is all that different from this traditional 
federalism account. Professor Gerken argues that her account offers a more 
expansive set of benefits than the laboratories account, including the “benefits 
associated with playing out political conflicts in different settings with 
different power dynamics,” or the benefits of “regulatory overlap”
48
 and 
redundancy. But I read traditional federalism theory to have always included 
these benefits. 
 
far states can vary in their implementation of federal law.” Gerken, supra note 2, at 1035 n.158. 
But my account fixates on federal statutes because they are how federalism is generated; it does 
not turn on the question of when federal statutes should be enacted. Professor Gerken fixates on 
the different question of what nationalism is for and much seems to rest on when and why that 
preemptive move is made. My critique here goes not to the descriptive aspect of the account, with 
which I largely agree, but rather to want of more developed principles of nationalism. 
 48. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1036. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1060 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1045 
 
My point is not that the value of Professor Gerken’s theory depends on its 
identification of a never-before-seen benefit; it certainly does not. Rather, it is 
to put pressure on the new nationalists to explain how the “nationalism” aspect 
of their account adds to or changes the stakes of the benefits that we already 
understood to be generated by the states even acting outside of a national 
framework. 
One difference, to be sure, is that the source of this federalism is different 
from Brandeis’s, whether we call this modern-source federal statutes or use 
Professor Gerken’s broader conceptualization of a federalism “without 
sovereignty.”
49
 But this particular difference does not seem to be driving 
Professor Gerken herself or what she would argue most distinguishes her view 
from Brandeis’s. Maybe Professor Gerken’s point is simply that old-fashioned, 
Brandeisian federalism always was necessary to create the space for national 
policy churn, tolerance for diversity of perspectives and, when appropriate, 
resolution of differences. If that is the case, federalism is not the new 
nationalism but rather was always nationalism in the first place.
50
 
Professor Gerken also claims that her goals are different from what came 
before. This claim raises the age-old question of what federalism is “for.” In 
her view, federalism is a tool for the national end; the states qua states are not 
important along the way except insofar as their state-iness makes them 
effective instruments in this endeavor.
51
 But here, too, I wonder how deeply 
this differs from the view of the conventional federalists. This notion that 
federalism serves separation of powers, recognizes geographical diversity, and 
gives people voice—is that not also ultimately a vision in service of a national 
end? 
In other words, at bottom, perhaps it is just different definitions 
(understated and under-developed on each side) of both the nature of the states 
as means and also of the particular ends that separate the two sides. With 
respect to the “means,” the traditional federalists, as well as I, see something 
special in the state qua states, and the kind of state power we emphasize (I 
from within federal statutes, the traditionalists from without) is the kind of 
power perhaps uniquely available to government actors. For the Gerken camp, 
the same “means,” includes states but does not seem limited by that category 
and might even include non-governmental organizations. The new nationalists 
do not seem concerned with promoting or preserving state power in the 
traditional sense. 
 
 49. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term–Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2010). 
 50. LaCroix’s excellent work suggests precisely this. See LaCroix, supra note 45, at 2093. 
 51. Gerken, supra note 2, at 999–1000. 
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With respect to the ends, the Gerkenists see them as facilitating the 
production of good national-level policy and limiting strife in an environment 
prone to internal differences. The old-fashioned federalists’ ends are almost the 
opposite—they are skeptical of federal power and most interested in federalism 
as a tool that limits the reach of the national government that Professor Gerken 
would empower. But critically, here, both sides’ ends are in service of a vision 
of how a national democracy should work. 
3. There Is a Spectrum of Nationalism, Too 
What we probably need is a theory of nationalism capacious enough to 
include both sets of views, just as I have argued that our new federalism 
likewise sits on a broad (statutory) spectrum. A theory of nationalism that is 
more complex might include both Professor Gerken’s rosy view of the benefits 
of national policy and the more cynical view of the federal government 
sometimes using the states to facilitate its own encroachment. 
The very idea of a more capacious theory of nationalism makes another 
important point, one central to my own conceptualization: nationalism today 
works to enhance state power even as it expands national power. As I have 
detailed, federal statutory law has an enormous capacity for internal variation. 
Congress also often drafts federal laws that incorporate state laws by reference, 
another way to build local variation and state influence into national law. For 
example, the Social Security Act incorporates the state law definition of 
family,
52
 and so the Act not only operates differently across the fifty states but 
its meaning is influenced at its core by the (varied) development of state law. 
There is a worthy parallel to draw here between the way in which Congress 
has thus expanded the reach of federal statutes and the way in which the 
federal courts themselves expanded on their own federal power in an earlier 
era. And of course, both branches’ actions vis-à-vis the states are important to 
a complete understanding of nationalism today. Paul Mishkin’s famous work 
on the “variousness of ‘federal law’” made the case that, in filling gaps in 
federal statutes, the federal-common-law work of federal courts need not be, 
and in fact should not be, completely “federal” in nature.
53
 Drawing instead on 
the traditional “federalism” values, including local variation and the 
background norm of federal restraint, Mishkin argued that consideration of 
those values should drive federal judicial decisions about when to take state 
law as the rule of decision—for example, applying a state-law definition for an 
 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“An applicant is the wife, husband, widow, or 
widower of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter if the courts of 
the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files and [sic] 
application . . . .”). 
 53. Mishkin, supra note 46, 828–32. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1062 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1045 
 
undefined federal statutory term. Voluntary federal judicial incorporation of 
state law, Mishkin argued, helps to avoid “an unwarranted intrusion into areas 
traditionally and properly regarded as state domain.”
54
 Following Mishkin, 
Carol Goldberg-Ambrose took this point into the realm of federal-court 
jurisdiction, suggesting “nationalism” reasons why Congress might wish to 
create federal-court jurisdiction over certain questions, but still “federalism” 
reasons why Congress might prefer federal courts to use state law as the 
substantive rule of decision.
55
 
The link to federalism by the grace of Congress should be clear. When 
Congress offers the states a primary federal implementation role or writes 
federal laws that incorporate state terms, Congress is both making new federal 
law but also doing it with some self-conscious restraint in a way that builds 
diversity and state voice into it. That restraint may be motivated by 
instrumental reasons as traditional federalists fear—including a desire to push 
federal law into areas of historic state control—or by “federalism” reasons, as I 
have also suggested; or by a desire to reach a single-best national policy, as 
Professor Gerken has urged. Most likely it is a combination of all three 
reasons. 
4. Nationalism Without the National Government 
It also seems evident that we sometimes have “nationalism” in lawmaking 
without Congress or federal judge-made law at all. Taking a page from 
Professor Gerken, and as a mirror image to her “federalism without 
sovereignty,” one might call this “nationalism without the national 
government.” I introduce the concept here by way of buttressing my argument 
about nationalism’s complexity and illustrating the kind of further work 
necessary to unpack the concept. 
This idea of nationalism without the national government is a point that 
goes beyond the way that the states, as centers of political activity, influence 
public debate through their positions on federal statutes in which they have no 
formal role.
56
 States also do sometimes still act as first-movers, performing 
their traditional “states as laboratories” role, in trying out controversial 
policies: same-sex marriage being the most notable recent example. 
 
 54. Id. at 825–26. 
 55. Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 542, 566–83 (1983). 
 56. John Nugent and Judith Resnik have each written about how groups of state and even 
translocal actors together play central roles in federal statutory politics. JOHN D. NUGENT, 
SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL 
POLICYMAKING 168, 214–15 (2009); Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: 
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 776–80 (2008). 
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Sometimes, such state innovation even creates what might be understood as a 
different kind of “national law”—what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn 
have described as an informal fifty-state convergence that can make federal 
legislation unnecessary.
57
 This kind of “national” lawmaking should appeal to 
traditional federalists, to the extent that it restrains—by obviating the need 
for—congressional lawmaking. 
Other times, those state convergences take on a more formal character, for 
instance when one state models its laws after another. A striking example can 
be found in a slew of recent state food safety laws that condition the effective 
date of the state law on the adoption of a similar law by a number of other 
states.
58
 State courts also must sometimes create federal common law, just as 
federal courts do.
59
 
Another example of more formal action exists in the adoption by many 
states of Uniform Laws. The Uniform Commercial Code is the most prominent 
but represents only one of many such laws. These Uniform Laws exemplify 
how “national law”—sometimes more intentionally uniform than federal 
statutory law that depends on varied state implementation—can be created by 
states without Congress. 
The point here is simply to push the new nationalists on the concept of 
“our Nationalism.” Nationalism, like federalism, now takes different forms and 
has many different sources. How “national” any federal statute is, in the 
uniformity/preemption sense, will vary across the U.S. Code. Sometimes there 
can be national law without a federal statute at all. Sometimes “nationalism” is 
the end, sometimes “federalism” is the end. Sometimes they are the means 
relative to one another. 
C. Please, No More Nationalism or Federalism Without Doctrine 
One of the biggest failings of the “cooperative federalism” movement—by 
which I mean the second-generation federalists who fell between the old-
fashioned separate-spheres types and Professor Gerken’s new nationalists—
was its profound lack of doctrine. Non-dualist models of federalism have 
always suffered from this wishy-washiness problem when it comes to real law. 
This is a problem that separate-spheres federalism, which does have some 
well-defined doctrines like Commerce Clause doctrine, has not faced nearly to 
the same extent. For cooperative federalism, part of the reason for lack of 
doctrine is that the vast expanse of writing about interactive federalism mostly 
has been devoted to functional inquiries about the merits of state-federal 
interconnectedness or descriptive efforts illustrating those connections in 
 
 57. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 228–33, 240–43. 
 58. Id. at 309–48. 
 59. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102–04 (1962). 
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particular subject-matter areas.
60
 Alongside this important work, however, little 
attempt has been made to generate “law” effectuating the relationships being 
described.
61
 
As a result, cooperative federalism has developed no legal teeth. Consider 
a few of many possible examples that I have detailed elsewhere
62
: We have 
little real law to police the boundaries of Spending Clause legislation (instead 
we have only the “I know it when I see it” test for unconstitutional coercion 
applied in NIFB Sebelius—a test whose link to obscenity may not be 
accidental). We have no doctrines that govern hybrid state-federal 
administrative relationships, including whether state implementers of federal 
law receive anything like federal interpretive deference or any “process” 
protections when it comes to their interactions with federal agencies. And we 
have gaping holes in our doctrines of federal-court jurisdiction and choice of 
law. Consider this important question: are state laws and regulations that states 
enact to implement federal statutory schemes (for example, a state’s Clean Air 
Act State Implementation Plan) “federal” or “state” law in terms of their status 
for jurisdiction, applicable law, and so on? These are fundamental issues that 
go to the heart of how federal law is implemented and enforced today. And yet 
they remain unanswered. 
My biggest concern about the new Nationalist School is that it will 
ultimately suffer from precisely this same weakness. If it does, it will similarly 
be consigned to an abstract rhetorical concept with no real-world bite. 
Professor Gerken does not seem as perturbed by this possibility as I am and 
instead seems almost to embrace it, or perhaps sees it as a necessity. She 
argues that “[today’s federalism] is premised on practice as well as 
presumptions” and suggests that the new landscape she describes may not be 
amenable to doctrinal rules.
63
 “[A]t the end of the day,” she says, “much of 
‘Our Federalism’ requires little more than muddling through.”
64
 
To me, this is entirely unacceptable. But I can see why the Gerkenists 
might be less emotional about it. If federalism is simply a means not an end, 
then perhaps one does not need real doctrines to protect it. So understood, 
federalism is not “special”—it may even be interchangeable with other tools 
that might produce the same ends. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Kristin H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Matthew C. Waxman, National Security 
Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012). 
 61. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,  
285  (2005). 
 62. Gluck, supra note 13, at 2022–43 (laying out fifteen such unanswered questions about 
modern federalism doctrine). 
 63. Gerken, supra note 2, at 999. 
 64. Id. 
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But I would urge the new nationalists not to give up on the doctrines so 
quickly. Why not, instead, ask oneself what are the kind of conditions of state-
federal interaction we are trying to create and what legal doctrines could 
further those conditions? That will require these nationalists to be more 
specific about their theory of nationalism. What conditions do they need to 
create the “robust democracy” they say is their goal? Is it merely the space for 
internal variation and dissent with a backstop of preemption? Why wouldn’t 
legal doctrine work in that context? Part of the concern seems to be that legal 
doctrine cannot operate where categories are slippery. But why? If some 
statutes aim to encourage local variation and other statutes aim to end it with a 
preemptive “final” solution, why not simply use statutory interpretation 
doctrines to divine what animates Congress’s design along the nationalism-
federalism spectrum in a particular circumstance? 
Professor Gerken’s response to this seems to be that she is less interested 
in determining what Congress wants, and more interested in determining what 
the balance between state and federal should be. She also argues that 
determining what Congress wants is a question of statutory interpretation and 
is a lot easier to answer than the “constitutional law and democratic design” 
question of what the balance should be. I am not sure that is truly the case and 
it seems too easy a way out. Statutory interpretation has famously been one of 
the most inconsistent areas of law, one of least amenable to “real” legal 
doctrine. Constitutional boundaries have been easier to fix. Nor am I sure that 
what Professor Gerken really ultimately wants is to develop new constitutional 
boundaries. My guess is that she may ultimately look to ways that courts can 
influence congressional lawmaking involving the states—“democratic 
design”—whether by presumptions or other resistance norms that have long 
been the bread and butter of statutory interpretation. 
IV.  SOME DOCTRINES FOR THE FEDERALISTS FROM FEDERAL STATUTES 
I will conclude by “walking the walk” and trying to illustrate what I mean 
by developing doctrine by thinking through the kinds of conditions of state-
federal interaction one wishes to encourage. Because I believe in preserving 
the federalism within federal statutes, the doctrinal moves that I would advance 
will look different than Professor Gerken’s likely would. My doctrinal aim is 
to enhance state power within national law. 
Take the administrative law doctrines. Administrative law is critically 
important in the statutory era. Chevron deference—the rule that requires 
federal courts to accord deference to reasonable federal agency statutory 
interpretations when federal statues are ambiguous
65
—does an enormous 
 
 65. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
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amount of work in resolving statutory cases. But there is no set of 
administrative deference principles that likewise takes into account the fact 
that Congress sometimes delegates decision-making to the states. Instead, the 
lower federal courts have done precisely what Professor Gerken suggests. 
They’ve muddled through, in the process creating an unequal, uniform, and 
incoherent body of federal case law on the question of what standards apply to 
state implementation decisions of federal law.
66
 
Likewise, we have no set of doctrines that govern the federal-law-
implementation- bargaining process between the federal government and the 
states. Many federalism scholars are now writing about, for example, “waivers 
as the new federalism,”
67
 but waivers by and large happen in a big black box, 
with no transparency, no process, and no guiding doctrine. If one believes that 
the key to state power is inside federal law, then a regularized set of rules for 
negotiating waivers seems essential. 
Another bucket of doctrinal questions goes to the question of state law and 
its enduring importance in a landscape dominated by federal statutes. When I 
first started writing on this topic, I was of the same view as Professor Gerken: 
that sovereignty is both unimportant and perhaps absent from this new (new) 
federalism landscape. But after examining this landscape in more detail, my 
views have changed. As detailed at the outset of this Article, my view is now 
that state law—the product of the state sovereign apparatus—has a great deal 
to gain from the version of nationalism that I have offered. 
As a topical example, assume that Congress instead of enacting the very 
state-reliant ACA, had simply nationalized the entire system, creating what 
effectively would be “Medicare for all,” as many advocates had urged. What 
relevance then would state law carry in the health landscape? It would be 
nothing. There would be no state laws, no state regulations, no state officials, 
and no state court work on the broad swaths of health policy—from insurance 
markets to medical service delivery—that the ACA covers. Period. 
Instead, because Congress chose to give the states such a central role in the 
statute, we now have hundreds of state laws and state regulations and many 
 
 66. Compare, e.g., Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495–96 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(no deference to state implemeters) with Bell South Telecomms., Inc. v. Sanford, 494 F.3d 439, 
449 (4th Cir. 2007) (Skidmore level deference). For more examples, see Gluck, supra note 20, at 
611–12 
 67. For a few of many recent examples, see Samuel Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After 
the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); Theodore Ruger, Health Policy 
Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE 
CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 359 (Nathaniel Persily et al. 
eds., 2013); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
265 (2013). 
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new state government positions created because of this federal statute but at 
the same time wholly autonomous from it. State courts for years to come will 
be busy adjudicating these cases. These state laws, regulations, cabinet 
positions, and court decisions that the ACA has generated are formally 
identical to any “ordinary” state laws, regulations, cabinet positions, and court 
decisions. The federal statute has empowered and enlarged the state sovereign 
apparatus. 
So for someone who wishes to take a more federalist view of this 
nationalism, what doctrines would better advance the state sovereignty within 
these federal schemes? 
By way of very non-exhaustive illustration, we might develop, as I have 
argued elsewhere,
68
 a Chevron analogue for state implementers of federal law. 
We might impose process or other requirements on federal agencies to guide 
the administrative waiver and implementation process. As two recent and path-
marking efforts in this regard by Congress, it is worth drawing attention to the 
new provisions in the ACA governing Medicaid demonstration waivers and 
also the special deference rules enacted as part of Dodd-Frank. With respect to 
the waivers, as Sidney Watson has insightfully pointed out, the ACA directly 
responds to the above-noted concerns about waivers being negotiated behind 
closed doors with no process constraints. The ACA for the first time makes 
waiver applications public, sets forth what must be specified, requires CMS to 
be similarly specific and publicly disclose what is being approved and why, 
along with public comments, and requires CMS to create a process for notice 
and comment at both the state and federal levels.
69
 
With respect to the deference rules, Congress set forth a special deference 
doctrine in Dodd Frank to guide the state-federal relationship in the 
implementation of that statute. The statute directs courts to depart from the 
strong presumption of Chevron deference to federal agency implementation 
when the federal agency would interpret the statute in ways that would 
preempt state consumer financial laws.
70
 Both of these examples—the ACA 
 
 68. Gluck, supra note 20, at 601–06. 
 69. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 10201(i) 
(2010) (amending § 1115 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012) on Medicaid 
demonstrations); Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using Section 1115 
Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2015). See also ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF 
WAR WITHIN 267–68 (2011) (discussing the state-federal administrative bargaining process). 
 70. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111–203, 
§ 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015–16 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b) (stating that a court 
reviewing the Comptroller of the Currency’s decision to preempt a state consumer financial law 
“shall assess the validity of such determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the 
consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with 
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waiver provisions and the Dodd-Frank administrative-preemption provision—
are instances in which Congress has proposed new doctrines to advance 
federalism within federal statutes. 
Consider another example by way of another answer. Assume that the state 
of Missouri enacts a state statute to implement the federal Clean Air Act. 
Eventually that statute gets challenged in court. Which court should hear that 
case? The answer depends on one’s view of what the Missouri legislature is 
doing. If one views the Missouri legislature as creating federal law, as simply 
acting as a servant for the federal government, then perhaps one would permit 
removal of the case to federal court as a federal question. But if one views the 
Missouri legislature as making state law—or if one wishes to encourage a 
view of the laws that states make in service of federal law as state law, then 
one might adopt a very different rule of federal-question jurisdiction that views 
these as state-law, not federal-law, questions and keeps them in state courts.
71
 
At the moment, there is no clear doctrinal answer to this question and 
many others like it, a point I have elaborated elsewhere.
72
 I believe these 
doctrinal gaps exist not because there are no doctrines to be had, as Professor 
Gerken suggests,
73
 but rather because we are experiencing an identity crisis. Or 
at least a theory of nationalism-federalism that remains not fully developed. 
There is a profound ambiguity about what’s going on here that goes directly to 
the slippage between the categories that Professor Gerken’s lecture so 
brilliantly highlights. When it comes to understanding the nature of these state 
law moves in service of federal law—whether they are state moves, federal 
moves, or something in between—we just do not know or are not ready to 
answer. 
Part of the blame must be placed on the old-fashioned federalists. They 
have been so focused on keeping the federal government out of lawmaking 
entirely that they haven’t focused at all on how to preserve state power when it 
is too late to prevent federal incursion. In other words, they haven’t recognized 
these questions of how to empower state law within federal administration and 
federal law implementation as “federalism questions” in the first place. 
But federalism questions they most certainly are. As another bucket of 
examples, states have their own different principles of agency deference, their 
own standards of review, and their own rules of statutory interpretation—and 
 
other valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive 
and relevant to its decision.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 521, 581 (2012). 
 71. For a more developed doctrinal argument for such an approach, see Gluck, supra note 
13, at 2022–43. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Gerken, supra note 2, at 999. 
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these do not look the same as their federal counterparts. But federal courts 
adjudicating cases involving state implementation of federal law often apply 
federal standards of review, federal deference doctrines, and even federal 
statutory interpretation doctrines to these state laws.
74
 Those choice-of-law 
decisions may make sense for those in Professor Gerken’s car if the aim is a 
national end (and there, by the way, is how doctrine could be made in support 
of that position). But if the goal is, as mine is, to find the federalism within 
federal statutes, then legal doctrine might recognize those state statutory 
implementation rules as state law that needs to be respected and effectuated 
even in a federal statutory era. 
When federal courts decide cases involving state legislation—even state 
legislation that implements federal law—a state-centered doctrinal approach 
would say that federal courts must apply state standards of review, state 
agency deference rules, and state interpretive doctrines, among other state 
decision-making rules. Let’s not forget the most famous federalism rule of all: 
the Erie Doctrine, which requires federal courts to apply state-law principles to 
decide state-law questions,
75
 but which somehow has fallen under the table 
when it comes to its distinctly modern application to these statutory decision-
making doctrines.
76
 
At the same time, the states should bear some burdens themselves if they 
are to be empowered in this way. For instance, states may deserve to be held 
more accountable than they have been for their efforts in service of federal 
law. At the moment it is very difficult to directly challenge state 
implementation of federal-law. The Supreme Court has strongly hinted that 
when a federal agency is in the picture, any challenge to an implementation 
effort should be framed as a challenge to the federal agency, rather than to the 
underlying state decision.
77
 Thus, if a citizen wishes to challenge Missouri’s 
laws implementing Medicaid as inconsistent with the terms of the Medicaid 
statute, but the United States Department of Health and Human Services has 
 
 74. I have detailed these decisions in Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1927–58 (2011), and Gluck, 
supra note 20, at 609–15. See also Josh Bendor & Miles Farmer, Note, Curing the Blind Spot in 
Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework for State Agencies Implementing 
Cooperative Federalism Statutes, 122 YALE L.J. 1280, 1295–306 (2013) (discussing other 
decision-making rules, such as standards of review). 
 75. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–78 (1938). 
 76. Gluck, supra note 13, at 2036–37. 
 77. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012). Cf. 
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., No. 14-15 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2015) (leaving open the 
possibility of a challenge to such state implementation at the discretion of the Court’s equity 
powers). 
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not objected to the state program, there is currently no obvious legal avenue to 
bring a direct challenge to the states. 
As part of treating the states as sovereigns within federal schemes, 
however, legal doctrine could facilitate direct challenges that hold the states 
accountable for such decisions. To paraphrase a great thinker (Spiderman): 
with great power should come great responsibility.
78
 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, what we have is an identity crisis and a lack of theory. What is 
state, what is national, what is both?
79
 In this sense, Professor Gerken’s 
groundbreaking work is spot-on in insisting that we dismantle the divide 
between the categories. The harder question is where her car is going. To give 
us a new state of the legal order, the new nationalists need to give us a theory, 
a reason, and a doctrine to believe in. 
  
 
 78. See Stan Lee, Steve Ditko, & Art Simek, Amazing Fantasy, no. 15, SPIDERMAN! (Marvel 
Comics Aug. 1962) reprinted in, 1 ESSENTIAL SPIDER-MAN (1997) (“[W]ith great power there 
must also come—great responsibility.”). 
 79. Judith Resnik was one of the first to ask this question. See Judith Resnik, Categorical 
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 620–21 (2001). 
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